How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a challenging question. For the fundamental model system of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, classic game theory of infinite rationality predicts the Nash equilibrium (NE) state with every player randomizing her choices to avoid being exploited, while evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality in general predicts persistent cyclic motions, especially for finite populations. However, as empirical studies on human subjects have been relatively sparse, it is still a controversial issue as to which theoretical framework is more appropriate to describe decision making of human subjects. Here we observe population-level cyclic motions in a laboratory experiment of the discrete-time iterated RPS game under the traditional random pairwise-matching protocol. The cycling direction and frequency are not sensitive to the payoff parameter a. This collective behavior contradicts with the NE theory but it is quantitatively explained by a microscopic model of win-lose-tie conditional response without any adjustable parameter. Our theoretical calculations reveal that this new strategy may offer higher payoffs to individual players in comparison with the NE mixed strategy, suggesting that high social efficiency is achievable through optimized conditional response.
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a fundamental non-cooperative game. It has been widely used to study competition phenomena in society and biology, such as species diversity of ecosystems [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and price dispersion of markets [7, 8] . This game has three candidate actions R (rock), P (paper) and S (scissors). In the simplest settings the payoff matrix is characterized by a single parameter, the payoff a of the winning action (a > 1, see Fig. 1A ) [9] . There are the following non-transitive dominance relations among the actions: R wins over S, P wins over R, yet S wins over P (Fig. 1B) . Therefore no action is absolutely better than the others.
The RPS game is also a basic model system for studying decision making of human subjects in competition environments. Assuming ideal rationality for players who repeatedly playing the RPS game within a population, classical game theory predicts that individual players will completely randomize their action choices so that their behaviors will be unpredictable and not be exploited by the other players [10, 11] . This is referred to as the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which every player chooses the three actions with equal probability 1/3 at each game round. When the payoff parameter a < 2 this NE is evolutionarily unstable with respect to small perturbations but it becomes evolutionarily stable at a > 2 [12] . On the other hand, evolutionary game the- * ZW and BX contributed equally to this work. ZW, BX designed and performed experiment; HJZ, BX constructed theoretical model; HJZ developed analytical and numerical methods; BX, ZW, HJZ analyzed and interpreted data; HJZ, BX wrote the paper. Correspondence should be addressed to HJZ (zhouhj@itp.ac.cn).
ory drops the infinite rationality assumption and looks at the RPS game from the angle of evolution and adaption [13] [14] [15] [16] . Evolutionary models based on various microscopic learning rules (such as the replicator dynamics [12] , the best response dynamics [17, 18] and the logit dynamics [19, 20] ) generally predict cyclic evolution patterns for the action marginal distribution (mixed strategy) of each player, especially for finite populations.
Empirical verification of non-equilibrial persistent cycling in the human-subject RPS game (and other noncooperative games) has been rather nontrivial, as the recorded evolutionary trajectories are usually highly stochastic and not long enough to draw convincing conclusions. Two of the present authors partially overcame these difficulties by using social state velocity vectors [21] and forward and backword transition vectors [22] to visualize violation of detailed balance in game evolution trajectories. The cycling frequency of directional flows in the neutral RPS game (a = 2) was later quantitatively measured in [23] using a coarse-grained counting technique. Using a cycle rotation index as the order parameter, Cason and co-workers [24] also obtained evidence of persistent cycling in some evolutionarily stable RPS-like games, if players were allowed to update actions asynchronously in continuous time and were informed about the social states of the whole population by some sophisticated 'heat maps'.
In this work we investigate whether cycling is a general aspect of the simplest RPS game. We adopt an improved cycle counting method on the basis of our earlier experiences [23] and study directional flows in evolutionarily stable (a > 2) and unstable (a < 2) discrete-time RPS games. We show strong evidence that the RPS game is an intrinsic non-equilibrium system, which cannot be fully described by the NE concept even in the evolutionarily stable region but rather exhibits persistent populationlevel cyclic motions. We then bridge the collective cycling behavior and the highly stochastic decision-making of individuals through a simple conditional response (CR) mechanism. Our empirical data confirm the plausibility of this microscopic model of bounded rationality. We also find that if the transition parameters of the CR strategy are chosen in an optimized way, this strategy will outperform the NE mixed strategy in terms of the accumulated payoffs of individual players, yet the action marginal distribution of individual players is indistinguishable from that of the NE mixed strategy. We hope this work will stimulate further experimental and theoretical studies on the microscopic mechanisms of decision making and learning in basic game systems and the associated nonequilibrium behaviors [25, 26] .
Results

Experimental system
We recruited a total number of 360 students from different disciplines of Zhejiang University to form 60 disjoint populations of size N = 6. Each population then carries out one experimental session by playing the RPS game 300 rounds (taking 90-150 minutes) with a fixed value of a. In real-world situations, individuals often have to make decisions based only on partial input information. We mimic such situations in our laboratory experiment by adopting the traditional random pairwisematching protocol [11] : At each game round (time) t the players are randomly paired within the population and compete with their pair opponent once; after that each player gets feedback information about her own payoff as well as her and her opponent's action. As the whole experimental session finishes, the players are paid in real cash proportional to their accumulated payoffs (see Materials and Methods). Our experimental setting differs from those of two other recent experiments, in which every player competes against the whole population [9, 24] and may change actions in continuous time [24] . We set a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9 and 100, respectively, in one-fifth of the populations so as to compare the dynamical behaviors in the evolutionarily unstable, neutral, stable and deeply stable regions.
Action marginal distribution of individual players
We observe that the individual players shift their actions frequently in all the populations except one with a = 1.1 (this exceptional population is discarded from further analysis, see Supporting Information). Averaged among the 354 players of these 59 populations, the probabilities that a player adopts action R, P , S at one Non-transitive dominance relations (R beats S, P beats R, S beats P ) among the three actions. (C) The social state plane for a population of size N = 6. Each filled circle denotes a social state (nR, nP , nS); the star marks the centroid c0; the arrows indicate three social state transitions at game rounds t = 1, 2, 3.
game round are, respectively, 0.36 ± 0.08, 0.33 ± 0.07 and 0.32 ± 0.06 (mean ± s.d.). We obtain very similar results for each set of populations of the same a value (see Table S1 ). These results are consistent with NE and suggest the NE mixed strategy is a good description of a player's marginal distribution of actions. However, a player's actions at two consecutive times are not independent but correlated ( Fig. S1 ). At each time the players are more likely to repeat their last action than to shift action either counter-clockwise (i.e., R → P , P → S, S → R, see Fig. 1B ) or clockwise (R → S, S → P , P → R). This inertial effect is especially strong at a = 1.1 and it diminishes as a increases.
Collective behaviors of the whole population
The social state of the population at any time t is denoted as s(t) ≡ n R (t), n P (t), n S (t) with n q being the number of players adopting action q ∈ {R, P, S}. Since n R + n P + n S ≡ N there are (N + 1)(N + 2)/2 such social states, all lying on a three-dimensional plane bounded by an equilateral triangle (Fig. 1C) . Each population leaves a trajectory on this plane as the RPS game proceeds. To detect rotational flows, we assign for every social state transition s(t) → s(t + 1) a rotation angle θ(t), which measures the angle this transition rotates with respect to the centroid c 0 ≡ (N/3, N/3, N/3) of the social state plane [23] . Positive and negative θ values signify counter-clockwise and clockwise rotations, respectively, while θ = 0 means the transition is not a rotation around c 0 . For example, we have θ(1) = π/3, θ(2) = 0, and θ(3) = −2π/3 for the exemplar transitions shown in Fig. 1C .
The net number of cycles around c 0 during the time
As shown in Fig. 2 (A-E), C 1,t has an increasing trend in most of the 59 populations, indicating persistent counterclockwise cycling. The cycling frequency of each trajectory in [t 0 , t 1 ] is evaluated by
The values of f 1,300 for all the 59 populations are listed in Table 1 , from which we obtain the mean frequency to be 0.031 ± 0.006 (a = 1.1, mean ± SEM), 0.027 ± 0.008 (a = 2), 0.031 ± 0.008 (a = 4), 0.022 ± 0.008 (a = 9) and 0.018 ± 0.007 (a = 100). These mean frequencies are all positive irrespective to the particular value of a, indicating that behind the seemingly highly irregular social state evolution process, there is a deterministic pattern of social state cycling from slightly rich in action R, to slightly rich in P , then to slightly rich in S, and then back to slightly rich in R again. Statistical analysis confirms that f 1,300 > 0 is significant for all the five sets of populations (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.05). The correlation between the mean cycling frequency f 1,300 and the payoff parameter a is not statistically significant (Spearman's correlation test: r = −0.82, p = 0.19, for n = 5 mean frequencies; and r = −0.16, p = 0.24, for n = 59 frequencies). We also notice that the mean cycling frequency in the second half of the game (f 151,300 ) is slightly higher than that in the first half (f 1,150 ) for all the five sets of populations (Table S2 ), suggesting that cycling does not die out with time.
A recent experimental work [27] also observed cycling behaviors in a RPS-like game with more than three actions. Evidences of persistent cycling in some completeinformation and continuous-time RPS-like games were reported in another experimental study [24] . However, no (or only very weak) evidence of population-level cycling was detected in [24] if action updating was performed in discrete time. Here and in Ref. [23] we find that even discrete-time updating of actions will lead to collective cyclic motions in the RPS game, and such a populationlevel behavior is not affected by the particular value of a.
Empirical conditional response patterns
Under the assumption of mixed-strategy NE, the social state transitions should obey the detailed balance condition. Therefore the observed persistent cycling behavior cannot be understood within the NE framework. Persistent cycling can also not be explained by the independent decision model which assumes the action choice of a player at one time is influenced only by her action a = 1.1 2 4 9 100 f1,300 f1,300 f1,300 f1,300 f1,300 √ ns, with sample number ns = 11 for a = 1.1 and ns = 12 for a = 2, 4, 9 and 100).
at the previous time (see Supporting Information). Using the empirically determined action shift probabilities of Fig. S1 as inputs, we find that this independent decision model predicts the cycling frequency to be 0.0050 (for a = 1.1), −0.0005 (a = 2.0), −0.0024 (a = 4.0), −0.0075 (a = 9.0) and −0.0081 (a = 100.0), which are all very close to zero and significantly different from the empirical values.
The action choices of different players must be mutually influenced. Our empirical data shown in Fig. 2 (F-J) confirm the existence of such mutual influences. Let us denote by O the performance (output) of a player at a given game round, with O ∈ {W (win), T (tie), L (lose)}. Conditional on the output O, the probability that this player will decide to shift action clockwise or counterclockwise or keep the same action in the next play is denoted as O − , O + and O 0 (≡ 1 − O − − O + ), respectively. Most interestingly, we see from Fig. 2 (F-J) that if a player wins over her opponent in one play, her probability (W 0 ) of repeating the same action in the next play is considerably higher than her probabilities (W − and W + ) of shifting actions. Furthermore, for payoff parameter a ≥ 2, if a player loses to her opponent in one play, she is more likely to shift action clockwise (probability L − ) than either to keep the old action (L 0 ) or to shift action counter-clockwise (L + ). 
The conditional response model
Inspired by these empirical observations, we develop a simplest nontrival model by assuming the following conditional response strategy: at each game round, every player review her previous performance O ∈ {W, T, L} and makes an action choice according to the corresponding three conditional probabilities We can solve this win-lose-tie CR model analytically and numerically. Let us denote by n rr , n pp , n ss , n rp , n ps and n sr , respectively, as the number of pairs in which the competition being R-R, P -P , S-S, R-P , P -S, and S-R, in one game round t. Given the social state s = (n R , n P , n S ) at time t, the conditional joint probability distribution of these six integers is expressed as P s n rr , n pp , n ss , n rp , n ps , n sr = n R !n P !n S !δ (N − 1)!!2 nrr n rr !2 npp n pp !2 nss n ss !n rp !n ps !n sr ! , 
where θ s→s ′ is the rotation angle associated with the social state transition s → s ′ , see Eq. [7] . Using the empirically determined response parameters as inputs, the CR model predicts the mean cycling frequencies for the five sets of populations to be f cr = 0.035 (a = 1.1), 0.026 (a = 2), 0.030 (a = 4), 0.018 (a = 9) and 0.017 (a = 100), agreeing well with the empirical measurements. Such good agreements between model and experiment are achieved also for the 59 individual populations ( Fig. 2 K-O) .
Because of the rotational symmetry of the conditional response parameters, the CR model predicts that each player's action marginal distribution is uniform (see Supporting Information), identical to the NE mixed strategy. On the other hand, according to this model, the expected payoff g cr per game round of each player is
where g 0 ≡ (1 + a)/3 is the expected payoff of the NE mixed strategy, and τ cr is the average fraction of ties among the N/2 pairs at each game round, with the expression
(n rr + n pp + n ss )P s (n rr , . . . , n sr ) N/2 .
(6) The value of g cr depends on the CR parameters. By uniformly sampling 2.4 × 10 9 instances of Γ from the three-dimensional probability simplex, we find that for a > 2, g cr has high chance of being lower than g 0 (Fig. 3) , with the mean value of (g cr − g 0 ) being −0.0085(a − 2). (Qualitatively the same conclusion is obtained for larger N values, e.g., see Fig. S2 for N = 12.) This is consistent with the mixed-strategy NE being evolutionarily stable [12] . On the other hand, the five g cr values determined by the empirical CR parameters and the corresponding five mean payoffs of the empirical data sets all weakly exceed g 0 , indicating that individual players are adjusting their responses to achieve higher accumulated payoffs (see Supporting Information). The positive gap between g cr and g 0 may further enlarge if the individual players were given more learning time to optimize their response parameters (e.g., through increasing the repeats of the game).
As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. S2 , the CR parameters have to be highly optimized to achieve a large value of g cr . For population size N = 6 we give three examples of the sampled best CR strategies for a > 2: Γ 1 = {0.002, 0.000; 0.067, 0.110; 0.003, 0.003}, with cycling frequency f cr = 0.003 and g cr = g 0 + 0.035(a − 2); Γ 2 = {0.995, 0.001; 0.800, 0.058; 0.988, 0.012}, with f cr = −0.190 and g cr = g 0 + 0.034(a − 2); Γ 3 = {0.001, 0.004; 0.063, 0.791; 0.989, 0.001}, with f cr = 0.189 and g cr = g 0 + 0.033(a − 2). For large a these CR strategies outperform the NE mixed strategy in payoff by about 10%. Set Γ 1 indicates that population-level cycling is not a necessary condition for achieving high payoff values. On the other hand, set Γ 3 implies W 0 ≈ 1, L 0 ≈ 0, therefore this CR strategy can be regarded as an extension of the win-stay lose-shift (also called Pavlov) strategy, which has been shown by computer simulations to facilitate cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game [29] [30] [31] [32] .
Discussion
In game-theory literature it is common to equate individual players' action marginal distributions with their at population size N = 6. We assume a > 2 and set the unit of the horizontal axis to be (a − 2). The solid line is obtained by sampling 2.4 × 10 9 CR strategies uniformly at random; the filled circle denotes the maximal value of gcr among these samples.
actual strategies [11, 16] . In reality, however, decisionmaking and learning are very complicated neural processes [33] [34] [35] [36] . The action marginal distributions are only a consequence of such complex dynamical processes, their coarse-grained nature makes them unsuitable to describe dynamical properties. Our work on the finite-population RPS game clearly demonstrates this point. This game exhibits collective cyclic motions which cannot be understood by the NE concept but are successfully explained by the empirical data-inspired CR mechanism. As far as the action marginal distributions of individual players are concerned, the CR strategy is indistinguishable from the NE mixed strategy, yet it is capable of bringing higher payoffs to the players if its parameters are optimized. This simple conditional response strategy, with the win-stay lose-shift strategy being a special case, appears to be psychologically plausible for human subjects with bounded rationality [37, 38] . For more complicated game payoff matrices, we can generalize the conditional response model accordingly by introducing a larger set of CR parameters. It should be very interesting to re-analyze many existing laboratory experimental data [9, 24, 27, [39] [40] [41] [42] ] using this extended model.
The CR model as a simple model of decision-making under uncertainty deserves to be fully explored. We find the cycling frequency is not sensitive to population size N at given CR parameters (see Fig. S3 ); and the cycling frequency is nonzero even for symmetric CR parameters (i.e., Fig. S4 ). The optimization issue of CR parameters is left out in this work. We will investigate whether an optimal CR strategy is achievable through simple stochastic learning rules [34, 35] . The effects of memory length [43] and population size to the optimal CR strategies also need to be thoroughly studied. On the more biological side, whether CR is a basic decision-making mechanism of the human brain or just a consequence of more fundamental neural mechanisms is a challenging question for future studies.
Materials and Methods
Experiment. The experiment was performed at Zhejiang University in the period of December 2010 to March 2014. A total number of 360 students of Zhejiang University volunteered to serve as the human subjects of this experiment. Informed consent was obtained from all the participants. These human subjects were distributed to 60 populations of equal size N = 6. The subjects of each population played within themselves the RPS game for 300 rounds under the random pairwise-matching protocol (see Supporting Information for additional details), with the payoff parameter a fixed to one of five different values. After the RPS game each human subject was rewarded by cash (RMB) privately. Suppose the accumulated payoff of a human subject is x in the game, then the reward y in RMB is y = r × x + 5, where the exchange rate r depends on a. According to the Nash equilibrium theory, the expected payoff of each player in one game round is (1 + a)/3. Therefore we set r = 0.45/(1 + a), so that the expected reward in RMB to each human subject will be the same (= 50 RMB) for all the 60 populations. The numerical value of r and the reward formula were both informed to the human subjects before the RPS game.
Rotation angle computation. Consider a transition from one social state s = (n R , n P , n S ) at game round t to another social states = (ñ R ,ñ P ,ñ S ) at game round (t + 1), if at least one of the two social states coincides with the centroid c 0 of the social state plane, or the three points s,s and c 0 lie on a straight line, then the transition s →s is not regarded as a rotation around c 0 , and the rotation angle θ = 0. In all the other cases, the transition s →s is regarded as a rotation around c 0 , and the rotation angle is computed through
where acos(x) ∈ [0, π) is the inverse cosine function, and m is the total number of players; µ, σ, Max and Min are, respectively, the mean, the standard deviation (s.d.), the maximum and minimum of the action marginal probability in question among all the m players. The last three rows are statistics performed on all the 354 players. Table S2 . Empirical cycling frequencies f 1,150 and f 151,300 for 59 populations. The first row shows the value of the payoff parameter a. For each experimental session (population), f 1,150 and f 151,300 are respectively the cycling frequency in the first and the second 150 time steps. µ is the mean cycling frequency, σ is the standard deviation (s.d.) of the cycling frequency, δ = σ/ √ n s is the standard error (SEM) of the mean cycling frequency. The number of populations is n s = 11 for a = 1.1 and n s = 12 for a = 2, 4, 9 and 100.
Supplementary Figure 1 Figure S1 . Action shift probability conditional on a player's current action. If a player adopts the action R at one game round, this player's conditional probability of repeating the same action at the next game round is denoted as R 0 , while the conditional probability of performing a counter-clockwise or clockwise action shift is denoted, respectively, as R + and R − . The conditional probabilities P 0 , P + , P − and S 0 , S + , S − are defined similarly. The mean value (vertical bin) and the SEM (standard error of the mean, error bar) of each conditional probability is obtained by averaging over the different populations of the same value of a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9, and 100 (from top row to bottom row). Figure S2 . Probability distribution of payoff difference g cr − g 0 at population size N = 12. As in Fig. 3 , we assume a > 2 and set the unit of the horizontal axis to be (a − 2). The solid line is obtained by sampling 2.4 × 10 9 CR strategies uniformly at random; the filled circle denotes the maximal value of g cr among these samples. 
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S1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We carried out five sets of experimental sessions at different days during the period of December 2010 to March 2014, with each set consisting of 12 individual experimental sessions. The payoff parameter value was fixed to a = 1.1, 2, 4, 9 and 100, respectively, in these five sets of experimental sessions. Each experimental session involved N = 6 human subjects (players) and it was carried out at Zhejiang University within a single day.
We recruited a total number of 72×5 = 360 undergraduate and graduate students from different disciplines of Zhejiang University. These students served as the players of our experimental sessions, each of which participating in only one experimental session. Female students were more enthusiastic than male students in registering as candidate human subjects of our experiments. As we sampled students uniformly at random from the candidate list, therefore more female students were recruited than male students (among the 360 students, the female versus male ratio is 217 : 143). For each set of experimental sessions, the recruited 72 players were distributed into 12 groups (populations) of size N = 6 uniformly at random by a computer program.
The players then sited separately in a classroom, each of which facing a computer screen. They were not allowed to communicate with each other during the whole experimental session. Written instructions were handed out to each player and the rules of the experiment were also orally explained by an experimental instructor. The rules of the experimental session are as follows:
(i) Each player plays the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game repeatedly with the same other five players for a total number of 300 rounds.
(ii) Each player earns virtual points during the experimental session according to the payoff matrix shown in the written instruction. These virtual points are then exchanged into RMB as a reward to the player, plus an additional 5 RMB as show-up fee. (The exchange rate between virtual point and RMB is the same for all the 72 players of these 12 experimental sessions. Its actual value is informed to the players.) (iii) In each game round, the six players of each group are randomly matched by a computer program to form three pairs, and each player plays the RPS game only with the assigned pair opponent.
(iv) Each player has at most 40 seconds in one game round to make a choice among the three candidate actions "Rock", "Paper" and "Scissors". If this time runs out, the player has to make a choice immediately (the experimental instructor will loudly urge these players to do so). After a choice has been made it can not be changed.
Before the start of the actual experimental session, the player were asked to answer four questions to ensure that they understand completely the rules of the experimental session. These four questions are: (1) If you choose "Rock" and your opponent chooses "Scissors", how many virtual points will you earn? (2) If you choose "Rock" and your opponent chooses also "Rock", how many virtual points will you earn? (3) If you choose "Scissors" and your opponent chooses "Rock", how many virtual points will you earn? (4) Do you know that at each game round you will play with a randomly chosen opponent from your group (yes/no)? During the experimental session, the computer screen of each player will show an information window and a decision window. The window on the left of the computer screen is the information window. The upper panel of this information window shows the current game round, the time limit (40 seconds) of making a choice, and the time left to make a choice. The color of this upper panel turns to green at the start of each game round. The color will change to yellow if the player does not make a choice within 20 seconds. The color will change to red if the decision time runs out (and then the experimental instructor will loudly urge the players to make a choice immediately). The color will change to blue if a choice has been made by the player.
After all the players of the group have made their decisions, the lower panel of the information window will show the player's own choice, the opponent's choice, and the player's own payoff in this game round. The player's own accumulated payoff is also shown. The players are asked to record their choices of each round on the record sheet (Rock as R, Paper as P , and Scissors as S).
The window on the right of the computer screen is the decision window. It is activated only after all the players of the group have made their choices. The upper panel of this decision window lists the current game round, while the lower panel lists the three candidate actions "Rock", "Scissors", "Paper" horizontally from left to right. The player can make a choice by clicking on the corresponding action names. After a choice has been made by the player, the decision window becomes inactive until the next game round starts.
The reward in RMB for each player is determined by the following formula. Suppose a player i earns x i virtual points in the whole experimental session, the total reward y i in RMB for this player is then given by y i = x i × r + 5, where r is the exchange rate between virtual point and RMB. In this work we set r = 0.45/(1 + a). Then the expected total earning in RMB for a player will be the same (= 50 RMB) in the five sets of experimental sessions under the assumption of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which predicts the expected payoff of each player in one game round to be (1 + a)/3. The actual numerical value of r and the above-mentioned reward formula were listed in the written instruction and also orally mentioned by the experimental instructor at the instruction phase of the experiment.
S2. THE MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The RPS game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which every player of the population adopts the three actions (R, P , and S) with the same probability 1/3 in each round of the game. Here we give a proof of this statement. We also demonstrate that, the empirically observed action marginal probabilities of individual players are consistent with the NE mixed strategy.
Consider a population of N individuals playing repeatedly the RPS game under the random pairwisematching protocol. Let us define ρ R i (respectively, ρ P i and ρ S i ) as the probability that a player i of the population (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }) will choose action R (respectively, P and S) in one game round. If a player j chooses action R, what is her expected payoff in one play? Since this player has equal chance 1/(N − 1) of pairing with any another player i, the expected payoff is simply g
. By the same argument we see that if player j chooses action P and S the expected payoff g P j and g S j in one play are, respectively, g
If every player of the population chooses the three actions with equal probability, namely that ρ Let us also discuss a little bit about the uniqueness of this mixed-strategy NE. If the payoff parameter a ≤ 1, this mixed-strategy NE is not unique. We can easily check that ρ
are two other pure-strategy NEs. In such a pure-strategy NE the payoff of a player is 1 in one game round. This value is considerably higher than the average payoff of (1 + a)/3 a player will gain if the population is in the above mentioned mixed-strategy NE.
On the other hand, if the payoff parameter a > 1, then there is no pure-strategy NE for the RPS game. This is simple to prove. Suppose the population is initially in a pure-strategy NE with ρ R i = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . If one player now shifts to action S, her payoff will increase from 1 to a. Therefore this player will keep the new action S in later rounds of the game, and the original pure-strategy NE is then destroyed.
We believe that the mixed-strategy NE of ρ 1, 2, . . . , N ) is the only Nash equilibrium of our RPS game in the whole parameter region of a > 1 (except for very few isolated values of a, maybe). Unfortunately we are unable to offer a rigorous proof of this conjecture for a generic value of population size N . But this conjecture is supported by our empirical observations, see Table S1 .
Among the 60 experimental sessions performed at different values of a, we observed that all the players in 59 experimental sessions change their actions frequently. The mean values of the individual action probabilities ρ R i , ρ P i , ρ S i are all close to 1/3. (The slightly higher mean probability of choosing action R in the empirical data of Table S1 might be linked to the fact that "Rock" is the left-most candidate choice in each player's decision window.)
We did notice considerable deviation from the NE mixed strategy in one experimental session of a = 1.1, though. After the RPS game has proceeded for 72 rounds, the six players of this exceptional session all stick to the same action R and do not shift to the other two actions. This population obviously has reached a highly cooperative state after 72 game rounds with ρ R i = 1 for all the six players. As we have pointed out, such a cooperative state is not a pure-strategy NE. We do not consider this exceptional experimental session in the data analysis and model building phase of this work.
S3. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We now demonstrate that the mixed-strategy NE with ρ 1, 2, . . . , N ) is an evolutionarily stable strategy only when the payoff parameter a > 2.
To check for the evolutionary stability of this mixedstrategy NE, let us assume a mutation occurs to the population such that n ≥ 1 players now adopt a mutated strategy, while the remaining (N − n) players still adopt the NE mixed strategy. We denote byρ R (and respectively,ρ P andρ S ) as the probability that in one round of the game, action R (respectively, P and S) will be chosen by a player who adopts the mutated strategy. Obviouslỹ
For a player who adopts the NE mixed strategy, her expected payoff in one game round is simply g 0 = (1 + a)/3. On the other hand, the expected payoffg in one game round for a player who adopts the mutated strategy is expressed asg =ρ RgR +ρ PgP +ρ SgS , whereg R (and respectively,g P andg S ) is the expected payoff of one play for a player in the mutated sub-population if she chooses action R (respectively, P and S):
Inserting these three expressions into the expression ofg, we obtain that
If the payoff parameter a > 2, we see from Eq.
[11] that the expected payoffg of the mutated strategy never exceeds that of the NE mixed strategy. Therefore the NE mixed strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy. Notice that the difference (g − g 0 ) is proportional to (a − 2), therefore the larger the value of a, the higher is the cost of deviating from the NE mixed strategy.
On the other hand, in the case of a < 2, the value of g − g 0 will be positive if two or more players adopt the mutated strategy. Therefore the NE mixed strategy is an evolutionarily unstable strategy.
The mixed-strategy NE for the game with payoff parameter a = 2 is referred to as evolutionarily neutral since it is neither evolutionarily stable nor evolutionarily unstable.
S4. CYCLING FREQUENCIES PREDICTED BY TWO SIMPLE MODELS
We now demonstrate that the empirically observed persistent cycling behaviors could not have been observed if the population were in the mixed-strategy NE, and they cannot be explained by the independent decision model either.
A. Assuming the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
If the population is in the mixed-strategy NE, each player will pick an action uniformly at random at each time t. Suppose the social state at time t is s = (n R , n P , n S ), then the probability M 0 [s ′ |s] of the social state being
which is independent of s. Because of this history independence, the social state probability distribution P * 0 (s) for any s = (n R , n P , n S ) is
The social state transition obeys the detailed balance condition that P *
Therefore no persist cycling can exist in the mixed-strategy NE. Starting from any initial social state s, the mean of the social states at the next time step is d(s) =
, identical to the centroid of the social state plane.
B. Assuming the independent decision model
In the independent decision model, every player of the population decides on her next action q ′ ∈ {R, P, S} in a probabilistic manner based on her current action q ∈ {R, P, S} only. For example, if the current action of a player i is R, then in the next game round this player has probability R 0 to repeat action R, probability R − to shift action clockwise to S, and probability R + to shift action counter-clockwise to P . The transition probabilities P − , P 0 , P + and S − , S 0 , S + are defined in the same way. These nine transition probabilities of cause have to satisfy the normalization conditions: R − + R 0 + R + = 1, P − + P 0 + P + = 1, and S − + S 0 + S + = 1.
Given the social state s = (n R , n P , n S ) at time t, the probability M id [s ′ |s] of the population's social state being
where n q→q ′ denotes the total number of action transitions from q to q ′ , and δ n m is the Kronecker symbol such that δ For this independent decision model, the steady-state distribution P * id (s) of the social states is determined by solving
When the population has reached this steady-state distribution, the mean cycling frequency f id is then computed as
where θ s→s ′ is the rotation angle associated with the transition s → s ′ , see Eq. [7] . Using the empirically determined action transition probabilities of Fig. S1 as inputs, the independent decision model predicts the cycling frequency to be 0.0050 (for a = 1.1), −0.0005 (a = 2), −0.0024 (a = 4), −0.0075 (a = 9) and −0.0081 (a = 100), which are all very close to zero and significantly different from the empirical values. Therefore the assumption of players making decisions independently of each other cannot explain populationlevel cyclic motions.
S5. DETAILS OF THE CONDITIONAL RESPONSE MODEL
A. Social state transition matrix
In the most general case, our win-lose-tie conditional response (CR) model has nine transition parameters,
These parameters are all non-negative and are constrained by three normalization conditions: The parameters W + and W − are, respectively, the conditional probability that a player (say i) will perform a counter-clockwise or clockwise action shift in the next game round, given that she wins over the opponent (say j) in the current game round. Similarly the parameters T + and T − are the two action shift probabilities conditional on the current play being a tie, while L + and L − are the action shift probabilities conditional on the current play outcome being 'lose'. The parameters W 0 , T 0 , L 0 are the probabilities of a player repeating the same action in the next play given the current play outcome being 'win', 'tie' and 'lose', respectively. For example, if the current action of i is R and that of j is S, the joint probability of i choosing action P and j choosing action S in the next play is W + L 0 ; while if both players choose R in the current play, the joint probability of player i choosing P and player j choosing S in the next play is then T + T − . We denote by s ≡ (n R , n P , n S ) a social state of the population, where n R , n P , and n S are the number of players who adopt action R, P and S in one round of play, respectively. Since n R + n P + n S ≡ N there are (N + 1)(N + 2)/2 such social states, all lying on a three-dimensional plane bounded by an equilateral triangle (Fig. 1C) .
Furthermore we denote by n rr , n pp , n ss , n rp , n ps and n sr , respectively, the number of pairs in which the competition being R-R, P -P , S-S, R-P , P -S, and S-R, in this round of play. These nine integer values are not independent but are related by the following equations: n R = 2n rr + n sr + n rp , n P = 2n pp + n rp + n ps , n S = 2n ss + n ps + n sr .
Knowing the values of n R , n P , n S is not sufficient to uniquely fix the values of n rr , n pp , . . . , n sr . the conditional joint probability distribution of n rr , n pp , n ss , n rp , n ps , n sr is expressed as Eq. [3].
To understand this expression, let us first notice that the total number of pairing patterns of N players is equal to
which is independent of the specific values of n R , n P , n S ; and second, the number of pairing patterns with n rr R-R pairs, n pp P -P pairs, . . ., and n sr S-R pairs is equal to n R ! n P ! n S ! 2 nrr n rr ! 2 npp n pp ! 2 nss n ss ! n rp ! n ps ! n sr ! .
Given the values of n rr , n pp , . . . , n sr which describe the current pairing pattern, the conditional probability of the social state in the next round of play can be determined.
We just need to carefully analyze the conditional probability for each player of the population. For example, consider a R-P pair at game round t. This is a lose-win pair, therefore the two involved players will determine their actions of the next game round according to the CR parameters (L − , L 0 , L + ) and (W − , W 0 , W + ), respectively. At time (t+1) there are six possible outcomes: (rr) both players take action R, with probability L 0 W − ; (pp) both players take action P , with probability L + W 0 ; (ss) both players take action S, with probability L − W + ; (rp) one player takes action R while the other takes action P , with probability (L 0 W 0 + L + W − ); (ps) one player takes action P while the other takes action S, with probability (L + W + + L − W 0 ); (sr) one player takes action S and the other takes action R, with probability (L − W − + L 0 W + ). Among the n rp R-P pairs of time t, let us assume that after the play, n rr rp of these pairs will outcome (rr), n pp rp of them will outcome (pp), n ss rp of them will outcome (ss), n rp rp of them will outcome (rp), n ps ps of them will outcome (ps), and n sr sr of them will outcome (sr). Similarly we can define a set of non-negative integers to describe the outcome pattern for each of the other five types of pairs.
Under the random pairwise-matching game protocol, our conditional response model gives the following expression for the transition probability M cr [s ′ |s] from the social state s ≡ (n R , n P , n S ) at time t to the social state 
Except for extremely rare cases of the conditional response parameters (e.g., Prob s (n rr , n pp , . . . , n sr ) 2(n rr + n pp + n ss ) + a(n rp + n ps + n sr )
Prob s (n rr , n pp , . . . , n sr )[n rp + n ps + n sr ] .
The expression [21] is identical to Eq.
[5] of the main text.
Using the five sets of CR parameters of Fig. 2 , we obtain the values of g cr for the five data sets to be g cr = g 0 + 0.005 (for a = 1.1), g cr = g 0 (a = 2), g cr = g 0 + 0.001 (a = 4), g cr = g 0 + 0.004 (a = 9), and g cr = g 0 + 0.08 (a = 100). When a = 2 the predicted values of g cr are all slightly higher than g 0 = (1 + a)/3, which is the expected payoff per game round for a player adopting the NE mixed strategy. On the empirical side, we compute the mean payoff g i per game round for each player i in all populations of the same value of a. The mean value of g i among these players, denoted as g, is also found to be slightly higher than g 0 for all the four sets of populations of a = 2. To be more specific, we observe that g−g 0 equals to 0.009±0.004 (for a = 1.1, mean ± SEM), 0.000 ± 0.006 (a = 2), 0.004 ± 0.012 (a = 4), 0.01 ± 0.02 (a = 9) and 0.05 ± 0.37 (a = 100). These theoretical and empirical results indicate that the conditional response strategy has the potential of bringing higher payoffs to individual players as compared with the NE mixed strategy.
B. The symmetric case
Very surprisingly, we find that asymmetry in the CR parameters is not essential for cycle persistence and direction. We find that if the CR parameters are symmetric with respect to clockwise and counter-clockwise action shifts (namely, W + /W − = T + /T − = L + /L − = 1), the cycling frequency f cr is still nonzero as long as W 0 = L 0 . The magnitude of f cr increases with |W 0 − L 0 | and decreases with T 0 , and the cycling is counter-clockwise Fig. S4 C. In other words, in this symmetric CR model, if losers are more (less) likely to shift actions than winners, the social state cycling will be counter-clockwise (clockwise).
To give some concrete examples, we symmetrize the transition parameters of Fig. 2 (F-J) while keeping the empirical values of W 0 , T 0 , L 0 unchanged. The resulting cycling frequencies are, respectively, f cr = 0.024 (a = 1.1), 0.017 (a = 2.0), 0.017 (a = 4.0), 0.015 (a = 9.0) and 0.017 (a = 100.0), which are all significantly beyond zero. Our model is indeed dramatically different from the best response model, for which asymmetry in decision-making is a basic assumption.
C. Sampling the conditional response parameters
For the population size N = 6, we uniformly sample 2.4 × 10 9 sets of conditional response parameters W − , W 0 , . . . , L 0 , L + under the constraints of Eq. [17] , and for each of them we determine the theoretical frequency f cr and the theoretical payoff g cr numerically. By this way we obtain the joint probability distribution of f cr and g cr and also the marginal probability distributons of f cr and g cr , see Fig. 3, Fig. S2 and Fig. S4 A. The mean values of |f cr | and g cr are then computed from this joint probability distribution. We find that the mean value of f cr is equal to zero, while the mean value of |f cr | ≈ 0.061.
The mean value of g cr for randomly sampled CR strategies is determined to be g 0 − 0.0085(a − 2) for N = 6. When a > 2 this mean value is less than g 0 , indicating that if the CR parameters are randomly chosen, the CR strategy has high probability of being inferior to the NE mixed strategy.
However, we also notice that g cr can considerably exceed g 0 for some optimized sets of conditional response parameters (see Fig. 3 for the case of N = 6 and Fig. S2 for the case of N = 12). To give some concrete examples, here we list for population size N = 6 the five sets of CR parameters of the highest values of g cr among the sampled 2.4 × 10 9 sets of parameters: To determine the influence of each of the nine conditional response parameters to the cycling frequency f cr , we fix each of these nine conditional response parameters and sample all the others uniformly at random under the constraints of Eq. [17] . The mean value f cr of f cr as a function of this fixed conditional response parameter is then obtained by repeating this process many times, see Fig. S4 B. As expected, we find that when the fixed conditional response parameter is equal to 1/3, the mean cycling frequency f cr = 0. Furthermore we find that 1. If W 0 , T + or L + is the fixed parameter, then f cr increases (almost linearly) with fixed parameter, indicating that a larger value of W 0 , T + or L + promotes counter-clockwise cycling at the population level.
2. If W − , T − or L 0 is the fixed parameter, then f cr decreases (almost linearly) with this fixed parameter, indicating that a larger value of W − , T − or L 0 promotes clockwise cycling at the population level.
3. If W + , T 0 or L − is the fixed parameter, then f cr does not change with this fixed parameter (i.e., f cr = 0), indicating that these three conditional response parameters are neutral as the cycling direction is concerned.
D. Action marginal distribution of a single player
The social state transition matrix Eq.
[19] has the following rotation symmetry:
Because of this rotation symmetry, the steady-state distribution P * cr (s) has also the rotation symmetry that P * cr (n R , n P , n S ) = P * cr (n S , n R , n P ) = P * cr (n P , n S , n R ) .
(23) After the social states of the population has reached the steady-state distribution P * cr (s), the probability ρ R cr that a randomly chosen player adopts action R in one game round is expressed as
where the summation is over all the possible social states s = (n R , n P , n S ). The probabilities ρ P cr and ρ S cr that a randomly chosen player adopts action P and S in one play can be computed similarly. Because of the rotation symmetry Eq.
[23] of P * cr (s), we obtain that ρ Therefore, if the players of the population all play the same CR strategy, then after the population reaches the the steady-state, the action marginal distribution of each player will be identical to the NE mixed strategy. In other words, the CR strategy can not be distinguished from the NE mixed strategy through measure the action marginal distributions of individual players.
E. Computer simulations
All of the theoretical predictions of the CR model have been confirmed by extensive computer simulations. In each of our computer simulation processes, a population of N players repeatedly play the RPS game under the random pairwise-matching protocol. At each game round, each player of this population makes a choice on her action following exactly the CR strategy. The parameters {W − , W 0 , . . . , L + } of this strategy is specified at the start of the simulation and they do not change during the simulation process.
S6. THE GENERALIZED CONDITIONAL RESPONSE MODEL
If the payoff matrix of the RPS model is more complex than the one shown in Fig. 1A , the conditional response model may still be applicable after some appropriate extensions. In the most general case, we can assume that a player's decision is influenced by the player's own action and the opponent's action in the previous game round.
Let us denote by q s ∈ {R, P, S} a player's action at time t, and by q o ∈ {R, P, S} the action of this player's opponent at time t. Then at time (t + 1), the probability that this player adopts action q ∈ {R, P, S} is denoted as Q 
This generalized conditional response model has 27 transition parameters, which are constrained by 9 normalization conditions (see Eq. [25] ). The social state transition matrix of this generalized model is slightly more complicated than Eq. [19] .
The win-lose-tie conditional response model is a limiting case of this more general model. It can be derived from this general model by assuming Q . These additional assumptions are reasonable only for the simplest payoff matrix shown in Fig. 1A .
